Despite large potential gains, international equity investment is less diversified across countries than predicted by the international version of the traditional capital asset pricing model (ICAPM). This paper provides empirical evidence on the impact of capital market frictions on international equity portfolios using data on bilateral equity holdings. Two important findings are reported: First, besides a home bias in equities, a 'friendship bias' can be observed for some country pairs. Second, indirect barriers such as the degree of financial market development and especially information asymmetries have strong explanatory power, whereas direct barriers such as capital flow restrictions have no impact.
Introduction
Despite large potential gains, international equity investment is less diversified across countries than predicted by the international version of the traditional capital asset pricing model (ICAPM) based on Sharpe (1964) , Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966) . According to the ICAPM, individuals should hold equities from countries around the world in proportion to their market capitalizations. However, empirical facts reveal that international portfolios are heavily biased towards domestic assets. This phenomenon − known as the 'home bias puzzle' − is one of the most striking empirical results in international economics. Table  1 shows that in 2001 U.S. investors hold almost 90 percent of their portfolios in domestic equity compared to a world market capitalization of U.S. equity of only 50 percent. For some countries this bias is even more pronounced, for example 67.8 percent compared to 3.9 percent for Germany and 85.9 percent compared to 1.25 percent for Spain. If one considers the European Monetary Union (EMU) as one large financial unit, the home bias phenomenon is also very noticeable: Investors hold 80.9 percent whereas market capitalization of the euro area amounts to 15.2 percent. This phenomenon has already attracted a large body of theoretical and empirical research. Lewis (1995 Lewis ( , 1999 and Karolyi and Stulz (2003) provide extensive reviews of the recent international economics and finance literature.
However, the puzzle is not yet fully resolved. This is partly due to the lack of data on cross-border holdings, especially of large cross-country panel data and of data with a reasonably long time series dimension. Therefore, most existing studies dealing with the home bias phenomenon are limited to data on U.S. foreign equity holdings or on countries' total foreign equity holdings not subdivided into country pairs. In contrast, this paper employs a more comprehensive data set, the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) , that allows to shed new light on bilateral equity holdings between countries for 1997 and 2001 as well as on their institutional determinants.
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An important assumption of the traditional version of the ICAPM is that there are no barriers to international investment. Based on the ICAPM, the theoretically predicted share of foreign assets at the country level is calculated in this paper and compared to the actual share observed in the data. The difference between these two values is then taken to investigate the relevance of different capital market frictions. This empirical approach is based on Ahearne, Griever and Warno ck (2004) and Edison and Warno ck (2004) .
The present paper contributes to the existing literature in two aspects. First, it extends the analysis of the home bias in equities to a large cross section of 38 countries whereas Ahearne, Griever and Warno ck (2004) and Edison and Warno ck (2004) look at U.S. holdings of foreign equities alone.
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The home bias phenomenon is described and characterized at the bilateral country level. An interesting finding is thereby -as far as known to the author -for the first time revealed: a phenomenon that I call bilateral 'friendship bias' that exists for several European country pairs. Second, Ahearne, Griever and Warno ck (2004) and Edison and Warno ck (2004) focus on information frictions as one important explanation of the home bias, which they proxy by firms' cross listings. In contrast, the present paper takes various institutional frictions to investment into account such as information asymmetries, financial market development and capital controls.
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Especially the impact of financial devel-1 As opposed to institutional explanations, individual investor behavior such as familiarity, probability judgments and social identity have also been considered in the literature to explain part of this phenomenon. The distinction between institutional and behavioral explanations was first suggested by French and Poterba (1991) . 2 Ahearne, Griever and Warno ck (2004) employ country-level data for 1994 and 1997; Edison and Warno ck (2004) use security-level data for U.S. firms for 1994 and 1997. 3 Frictions caused by non-tradable goods are not considered in this paper. Lewis (1999) tests implications of models assuming complete markets and non-tradable goods. She shows that these models are not able to explain the home bias. Baxter and Jermann (1997) show that when non-traded human capital is taken into account, the international diversification puzzle is even aggravated. opment is investigated more closely. It is proxied by the development of the equity market and, alternatively, of the banking sector. Financial development of both the home and the foreign country are considered and differences between them examined. Moreover, the analysis accounts for closely-held shares that cannot be freely traded (Dahlquist et al. 2003) .
The results provide new insights into the relevance of capital market frictions for foreign equity holdings using a large cross section of country pairs. The degree of equity market development of the country invested in plays a significant positive role, whereas the development of the banking sector in the investor's country is positively linked to portfolio shares of foreign equity investment. Information advantages measured by geographical proximity as well as by the existence of a common legal origin or, alternatively, of a common historical colonial relationship have great explanatory power. The existence of capital controls has no significant impact on the share of foreign equity investment, which, however, might be due to low data quality.
Section 2 describes the econometric specification and discusses the measures of capital market frictions employed in the empirical analysis. Descriptive statistics of portfolio compositions across countries and estimation results are presented in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
Empirical Approach
The empirical approach is based on the idea of comparing the portfolio share of foreign equities predicted by the International Capital Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM) to the empirical share in a world with capital market frictions. The discrepancy between these two measures is then explained by direct and indirect barriers to international investment at the country level. After explaining the economic specification in more detail, the variables of interest and the data are described. Finally, arising estimation issues are discussed.
Econometric Specification
In order to set up an empirical model, two different classes of theoretical capital asset pricing models are considered: first, the traditional version of the ICAPM without capital market frictions and, second, an ICAPM with barriers to international investment.
The first class of models goes back to Sharpe (1964) , Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966) . The traditional version of the ICAPM is built on the assumption that investment and consumption opportunity sets do not differ across countries. Investors are the same with respect to risk-aversion and information. These models assume perfect markets. The fact that countries use different currencies has no significant implications for portfolio choice and asset pricing. There are no taxes, no tariffs, no information asymmetries, no restrictions on short-sales and no barriers to international investment. One convenient property of this traditional version of the ICAPM is that it has simple and clear implications for investors' asset holdings: Investors hold the world market portfolio share of risky assets irrespective of their country of residence i. It follows that the portfolio share of country i invested into country j, W * j , can be expressed as:
where MCAP j,t denotes market capitalization of country j in period t and MCAP world,t world market capitalization in period t. This market portfolio share serves as the benchmark case of portfolio holdings to which the actual portfolio share that can be observed in the data is compared. The second class of models by Black (1974) , Stulz (1981) , Merton (1987) and Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) relaxes the assumption of perfect markets.
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These models include frictions that are typically modeled as a deadweight cost or a tax on expected returns in the foreign country. Those costs can be interpreted as costs caused by capital controls, taxes, information costs or transaction costs. These models only provide for testable implications of single model parameters, however, and do not allow to deduct an estimation equation of portfolio shares and various types of capital market frictions. Therefore, a reduced form approach is employed in the subsequent empirical analysis that combines -against the background of the above mentioned two classes of CAPM models with and without frictions -the market portfolio share, W * j,t , investment costs, C i,t , C j,t and C ij,t , and observed portfolio shares, W act ij,t :
5 Deviations from the optimal portfolios in the case of the traditional ICAPM mentioned above can also arise due to deviations from purchasing power parity such as in the model by Adler and Dumas (1981) . However, Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) show empirically that large parts of the home bias in equity puzzle cannot be explained by this model.
The optimal share of investment in the ICAPM with perfect markets, W * j,t , enters the right hand side.
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C i,t , C j,t and C ij,t are vectors referring to the country of origin i, the country of destination j or the country pair ij.
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These vectors consist of variables that take account of investment costs due to indirect or direct barriers to investment. Investment costs can be proxied by indicators of capital market frictions as discussed in the following section. They are in the center of interest in this paper. The vector Z ij,t includes additional variables that mirror investment opportunities and diversification considerations. These variables are additional covariates that are discussed in more detail in the next section. Moreover, a constant, α 0,t , and a nuisance term, ij,t , are included. ij,t captures all the factors affecting actual portfolio shares other than measured by the above mentioned explanatory variables.
Variables of Interest Information Frictions
Asymmetric information is regarded as a key factor of explaining the empirical evidence on foreign asset holdings and international capital flows. Martin and Rey (2004) construct a gravity model where transaction costs and costs caused by information asymmetries between two countries are proxied by geographical distance. The model implies that gross bilateral asset flows will be greater the smaller the distance. Di Giovanni (2005) , Portes and Rey (2005) and Ghosh and Wolf (2000) use this gravity model to explain cross-border capital flows between countries.
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In Portes and Rey (2005) , information frictions are also captured by using variables measuring directly the degree of asymmetry between domestic and foreign investors such as the volume of telephone traffic and the number of bank branch subsidiaries as well as an index of insider trading. They find that for a large cross section of countries the geographical component dominates in explaining the volume and direction of international capital flows. Geographical distance does not only play an important role for investment at the cross-country level but also within countries: Using firm level data, Coval and Moskowitz (1999) and Huberman (2001) Information advantages do not only arise due to geographical proximity but also due to similarity of institutions and legal structures. Legal rights of investors differ very much across countries. A large part of this variation is accounted for by legal origin. This applies especially to commercial laws for the financing of firms and for investment but also to law enforcement (La Porta et al. 1997 , 1998 . Thus a common legal origin indicates a lower level of information asymmetries. It is distinguished between German, French and Scandinavian civil law families, the English common law, and the Socialist law family.
The similarity of institutions can also be proxied by the fact that two countries share a common colonial background. Colonialism explains the building of institutions for several, although not all, countries (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2002) . The institutions are often very similar to those of the former colonizers. Thus, information advantages exist between former colonies and their colonizers.
The following variables are included to mirror information frictions:
9 the logarithm of distance between country i and country j, logdistance ij , and a dummy variable equal to one if a country pair has a common legal origin, samelegor ij . Alternatively, a dummy variable equal to one if two countries share a common colonial background is used, colony ij .
10

Financial Market Development
In larger and more liquid markets prices are supposed to be more informative. One reason is that larger markets encourage arbitrage through liquidity, the existence of more and better substitutes to use as hedges for trading against mispriced securities and reduced transaction costs (Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine, 2001; Wurgler, 2000) .
A common proxy for financial development such as the size and depth of the domestic capital market is the amount of private credit provided by the banking sector relative to GDP which is included in the subsequent regression analysis for the home and foreign country, logdcredit i,t and logdcredit j,t re-9 Section 2.3 and Table 10 in the Appendix include descriptions of all employed variables, their sources and exact calculations.
10 In the trade literature, a dummy variable that denotes whether two countries have a common language is often employed in order to proxy information advantages. Note that in this sample all country pairs that have a common colonial background at the same time share a common language and vice versa.
spectively.
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The banking sector plays an important role for private investment in many emerging economies as well as in continental Europe and Japan. It represents the overall development of the private banking sector -more specifically the development of its financial institutions that conduct and channel international equity investments -and the amount of liquidity available in the economy.
In order to capture an additional angle of financial development, stock market capitalization of country i and j relative to GDP is considered, logmcap i,t and logmcap j,t . It directly addresses the influence of growing equity markets on international investments which experienced a substantial growth in industrialized economies as well as in new markets of transitional and emerging countries in the 1990s.
Finally, a variable is employed that measures the actual liquidity in the equity market, i.e., it takes account of equity shares by large controlling shareholders that can not be freely traded. Especially in countries with poor investor protection many firms are controlled by large shareholders such that only a fraction of the shares issued by firms can be freely traded in these countries and held by foreign investors. La Porta et al. (1998) provide evidence that the size and breadth of capital markets is largely influenced by investor protection and the quality of the legal environment. Dahlquist et al. (2003) investigate the impact of equity shares held by large shareholders on U.S. foreign investment. They show that a country's share in U.S. equity portfolios is negatively related to the share of equities held by large shareholders in that country. In the subsequent regression analysis of the present paper the float portfolio share calculated by Dahlquist et al. (2003) 
, is used as a proxy for investor rights and the liquidity of the market. The float portfolio share is the market capitalization of a country excluding closely-held shares by controlling shareholders.
Direct Barriers
Direct barriers such as capital controls that have an immediate impact on net investment returns and, therefore, on the investment decision are also considered. Albeit having been reduced to a great extent throughout the 1990s, capital controls are still existent today. The crucial question is whether 11 See for example Chinn and Ito (2006) and Di Giovanni (2005) . As a comparable measure M2 to GDP is often used. However, this variable is only available for a much smaller number of countries.
controls that are in place are in fact effective.
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Although there have been attempts to determine measures of the effectiveness of capital controls, these are only available for a very small number of countries or years.
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Given the large cross-country data sample that is employed in the present paper, a financial openness measure is used that was for the first time provided by Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995) based on the IMF's Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER), restrict i,t and restrict j,t . It does not account for the effectiveness of capital controls but only states whether restrictions on capital flows are in place or not.
Additional Covariates
Two different variables are considered that mirror diversification and investment opportunities. First, a correlation variable that is equal to the monthly return correlation in the four years preceding year t is added, rcorr ij,t . If diversification motives matter for investors' investment decisions, countries hold a higher portfolio share of those foreign assets whose stock returns are only weakly correlated with domestic stock returns.
Second, GDP growth for the country of destination is included, gdpgrowth j,t . Again this variable is averaged across the four years preceding year t in order to avoid business cycle effects.
14 High GDP growth in the foreign country j mirrors profitable investment opportunities that emerge in booming economies. This is an implication of standard growth theory. Emerging countries in Southeast Asia in the 1990s that experienced booming economies and large capital inflows at the same time constitute a well-known example of this relationship.
Data
So far, reliable bilateral holdings data has hardly been available except for the results of some smaller surveys of residents' portfolio holdings such as for the U.S. in 1994 and 1997. The present work is based on cross-country equity holdings obtained from the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). For the first time this data set includes comparable portfolio holdings data from as many countries 12 For a detailed description of different types of capital controls and their effectiveness see Edison et al. (2002) and Neely (1999) ; for different country experiences see Ariyoshi et al. (2000) .
13 See, e.g., Edison et al. (2002) for a comprehensive overview of capital control measures. 14 Alternatively, seven and ten year averages have been considered. However, results do not change. Table 2 lists all countries by regions.
The CPIS data refers to end of year numbers and includes, among other things, information on gross bilateral foreign equity holdings, securities and, for some countries, separately reported liabilities. Foreign equity holdings entail cross-border investment from all sectors: monetary authorities, general government, banks and other financial intermediaries, nonprofit organizations, and households.
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The greatest difficulty consists in capturing cross-border investments by households. The IMF provides the definitions and concepts, 16 whereas the data is organized by domestic statistical institutions as each country should take account of its own particular financial structure and circumstances. There are some differences in reporting equity holdings between the 1997 and 2001 waves. In 1997 the distinction between unavailable and zero was not made. Therefore, the two years are treated separately in the estimations.
The CPIS data is used in order to calculate actual portfolio shares of country j's assets held in country i. Note that country i refers to the residence of the holder of the security and country j refers to the residence of the issuer of the security.
Information on countries' total market capitalizations is taken from the World Development Indicators (WDI, 2002) and the International Federation of Stock Exchanges (FIBV).
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An alternative measure of market capitalizations, the liquidity adjusted float portfolio share, can be found in Dahlquist et al. (2003) . Data on GDP growth is obtained from WDI (2002) .
In order to measure information frictions, the physical distance between countries' capital cities and alternatively the fact of two countries sharing a common border is used. Moreover, a dummy variable is added that is equal to one if two countries have a common colonial background. All data are based on the CIA factbook 18 and are obtained from Frankel, Stein and Wei (1995) . A dummy variable, based on La Porta et al. (1998) , is included that is equal to one if both countries belong to the same legal family. The amount of domestic 15 Note that equity investment that establishes a direct investment relationship is excluded from the CPIS. See the definition in the IMF's Balance of Payments Manual, fifth edition (BPM5) and the IMF's Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey Guide.
16 These have to be in conformity with the BPM5. 17 The availability of stock market measures limits the amount of countries in the present sample to 38.
18 See www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/. (2002) , is used to proxy the degree of financial market development. Capital controls are taken account of by using an updated index by Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995) based on the IMF's AREAER. The capital control data refers to the home country as well as to the country of destination. Unfortunately, the data does not allow a clear separation of restrictions on inflows or outflows. Thus, the same indicator, restrict i,t and restrict j,t respectively, is included for both countries.
In 1997 as well as in 2000/01 there have been several banking crises, for example in Thailand, Malaysia and Turkey. This is taken into account by a dummy variable that is equal to one if a banking crisis as documented in Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) happened in the relevant or precedent year.
In order to calculate return correlations rcorr ij,t , standard national stock market indices by Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) are used.
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The regional classification of the countries is shown in Table 2 . It is based on the UN geographical region division 20 and used to construct region dummies. For more detailed information on variable definitions and sources refer to Table 10 in the Appendix.
Estimation Issues
In several cases reported investments are zero. These corner solution outcomes are likely due to an investor's optimization in a world with investment barriers which results in an optimal outcome of zero foreign equity holdings. Consequently, W act ij,t is zero. For all other observations the dependent variable is positive and continuous. Therefore, a corner solution model is estimated. In the context of this study, partial effects of W *
Note that these marginal effects refer to the full sample including zero and positive values. They are obtained by estimating a Tobit model censored at zero and by calculating average adjustment factors for the coefficients of the Tobit regression. All tables in this paper report these marginal effects instead of estimated coefficients.
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The corner solution model can be applied to the CPIS data for 2001, but not immediately to the 1997 wave, because -as mentioned in Section 2.3 -in 1997 zeros refer to both true zeros and missing values. In order to provide comparability across regressions for each year and to validate a Tobit estimation approach for the 1997 data, missing values are imputed by using the information of the 2001 wave: A Probit model fitting the probability of a missing or a zero entry given the explanatory variables mentioned above is estimated for 2001. The estimation output is reported in Table 3 . The estimated coefficients are used to estimate the probability of a zero or missing value for 1997. If the probability of a missing is larger than one half, the reported zero is changed into a missing value. In a first step, descriptive statistics of the composition of international equity portfolios and the extent of the home bias at the aggregate country level are presented. It serves to give a first comparison of bilateral portfolio shares in the data and optimal portfolio shares as predicted by the traditional version of the ICAPM under the assumption of perfect capital markets. In a second step, multivariate analysis are undertaken as described in Section 2.1. The results provide insights into the determinants of international equity portfolios.
Bilateral Friendship Bias versus Bilateral Home Bias
For all countries around the world with existing stock markets, a home bias in equities with respect to total home versus foreign investment can be observed. Table 1 in Section 1 presents an overview of this home bias for some selected countries. In contrast to a home bias referring to total home versus foreign investment, one can also observe a home bias at the bilateral country pair level. A bilateral home bias indicates that investors hold -compared to the traditional version of the International Capital Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM) -too little of their portfolio in foreign equities of a given country. For the U.S. this bilateral home bias is existent for all country pairs and has been amply discussed in the literature (e.g. Tesar and Werner, 1995; Ahearne, Griever and Warno ck, 2004) . However, for certain country pairs, especially within the EMU, one can observe a bilateral 'friendship bias'. It states that the actual equity portfolio share, W act ij,t , is larger than the one predicted by the ICAPM under the assumption of perfect capital markets, W * j,t . Table 4 documents the predicted and the actual shares. Bold numbers refer to country pairs with a bilateral friendship bias.
In most cases within the EMU this relationship is reciprocal, i.e., it is observed for the country pair Austria-Germany and at the same time for the country pair Germany-Austria. The number of country pairs with a friendship bias has increased substantially from 1997 to 2001. Moreover, the friendship bias has been persistent over the years: for almost all country pairs with a friendship bias in 1997 one can also observe a friendship bias in 2001. The fact that most country pairs with a friendship bias in the present data sample are part of the EMU might indicate that this phenomenon is related to the large extent of enhanced financial integration and development within the EMU. Also historical and cultural linkages might be an explanation. The results of the multivariate analysis that are discussed in the following section will shed more light on the determinants of international portfolio holdings.
Determinants of International Equity Portfolios
Main estimation results for the years 1997 and 2001 are summarized in Tables  5 and 6 . In the first specification, market capitalization of country j, W * j,t , is the only explanatory variable entering the regression. Subsequently, the introduced proxies for capital market frictions are added one after the other.
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The marginal effect of W * j,t on actual portfolio shares is highly significant but very low in size, namely equal to 0.05 in 1997 and 0.09 in 2001. The size does not change in the subsequent regressions when additional variables 22 Further robustness checks have been undertaken by excluding single countries from the sample in order to test whether major financial centers such as the U.K., Ireland and the U.S. drive the results. These additional regressions are not reported in the following, because results did not change. However, they can be obtained from the author upon request. enter. Noticeable, for a large cross section of countries the market portfolio share, W * j,t , which -in the traditional ICAPM under the assumption of perfect capital markets -just equals the portfolio share invested in country j for each country i, does hardly explain the actual share of foreign investment in country j, W act ij,t .
Information Asymmetries
Differences in accounting standards, disclosure requirements and regulatory environments across countries lead to information asymmetries between local and foreign investors. Foreign investors have to translate and interpret this information in light of the relevant legal conventions and business culture which leads to additional costs.
Information frictions proxied by logdistance ij and samelegor ij have highly significant and large coefficients. A one percent increase in geographical distance between two countries leads on average to a decrease in the portfolio share of equity holdings of about 0.16 percentage points in 1997 and 0.29 in 2001 (Tables 5 and 6 , specification (2)). If both countries have the same legal origin, the share of foreign equity holdings is on average about 0.25 percentage points higher in 1997 and even larger in 2001, namely equal to 0.43. When colony ij is used instead of samelegor ij (specification (3)), the effect is even larger: If both countries have a common colonial background, the marginal effect amounts to 0.40 in 1997 and in 2001 to 0.62.
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Overall, the results emphasize the importance of information frictions as determinants of international equity portfolios.
Financial Market Development
The second group of indirect capital market frictions refers to the degree of financial market development. Two alternative measures of financial development are considered: the relative size of the banking sector and the relative size of the equity market. They proxy different angles of financial market development but are positively correlated with each other. Moreover, the float portfolio share, W float j,t , is included instead of the market portfolio share, W * j,t , in order to exclude non-liquid equity shares.
Financial development of the banking sector in the source country i as well as in the country of destination j is proxied by the corresponding ratios of 23 Likewise, logdistance ij can be interchanged with a dummy variable equal to one if two countries are part of the same region or share a common border. The results can be obtained from the authors upon request. Notes: see Table 5 .
private credit provided by the financial sector relative to GDP, logdcredit i,t and logdcredit j,t . For both years only the coefficient for country i is significant and has a positive sign
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(specification (4)). A one percent increase in private credit relative to GDP in the home country i is associated with an increase in foreign portfolio shares of about 0.24 percentage points in 1997 and 2001. The positive effect indicates that more and better banking institutions and more liquidity in the banking sector at home -proxied by private credit relative to GDP in country i -are associated with more investments in foreign markets.
Stock market capitalization in country i, logmcap i,t , has no effect in 1997 and a negative effect in 2001.
25
The latter is in line with the consideration that more developed equity markets offer more diversification possibilities at home such that investors are less inclined to invest abroad. The negative marginal effect in 2001 amounts to 0.15. In contrast, stock market capitalization in country j, logmcap j,t has a positive and significant marginal effect on foreign portfolio shares which is equal to 0.08 in 1997 and 0.17 in 2001. Based on these results, investors seem to be more inclined to hold equity shares in such economies. The more developed equity markets in the foreign country j, the more informative are prices and investment opportunities.
All in all, the results suggest the following relationship between financial market development and foreign portfolio shares: Both, the relative size of the banking sector in the investor's country and the relative size of the stock market in the issuer's country are positively linked to foreign portfolio shares.
The effect of the float compared to the market portfolio share is slightly smaller in both years (specification (5)). In the full sample the float portfolio share does not seem to capture any further liquidity effects and thus does not provide any additional explanatory power compared to the market portfolio share, W * j,t .
Capital Controls
If capital controls on incoming capital are in place, the share of foreign equity investment into that country should be lower. Again a negative effect is expected if capital controls on outgoing capital are in place. Unfortunately, 24 If stock market capitalization is excluded from specification (4), logdcredit j,t has a positive and significant effect on actual portfolio shares. Due to the fact that logdcredit j,t and market capitalization, logmcap j,t , are positively correlated, the effect is attributed to logmcap j,t rather than logdcredit j,t once both variables enter the regression.
25 Note that the negative sign is not influenced by the alternative financial market development measure logdcredit i,t and still present in a regression without logdcredit i,t and logdcredit j,t .
the AREAER data does not allow to distinguish between incoming and outgoing capital controls. The results in Tables 5 and 6 show that capital controls have hardly any significant impact. Exceptions are specifications (6) and (7) in 1997. The existence of controls yields a weak positive effect that is significant at the 10 percent level only, meaning that the existence of controls in the country of origin, i, is associated with a higher share of foreign equity. This result is mainly driven by Chile that experienced high shares of foreign equity holdings and capital controls in 1997.
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Once Chile is excluded from the sample, the coefficient on restrict i,t turns negative in 1997.
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Moreover, the effect vanishes in the full sample when GDP growth is added.
Investment Opportunities and Diversification
In addition, variables mirroring investors' investment opportunities and diversification, i.e., GDP growth and return correlations respectively, are included in the regression analysis.
As specifications (7) and (8) (Tables 5 and 6) show, return correlations, rcorr ij,t , have no significant impact. A negative effect would be consistent with a diversification motive. The tendency to find either a positive relationship or none at all is in line with other empirical studies, e.g., Portes and Rey (2005) and Aviat and Coeurdacier (2004) . The finding might be driven by the common positive impact that financial integration has on portfolio shares and return correlations at the same time. According to this argument, return correlations measure the effect of increased financial integration instead of measuring diversification opportunities. One possible solution to this measurement problem would be to instrument current stock market correlation. Coeurdacier and Guibaud (2005) show that when using stock return correlation over the period of 1950-1975 as an instrument, a diversification motive can be identified. As such data is not present for the country sample used in this paper, this approach cannot be undertaken, however. GDP growth is included for the country of destination. In booming economies that experience high GDP growth rates, more promising investment opportunities are likely to be existent. In line with this consideration, GDP growth in country j has a significantly positive impact in both years: A one percentage point increase in GDP growth leads to an increase in foreign equity holdings of about 0.07 percentage points in 1997 and 0.15 in 2001 (specification (8)).
Market and Float Portfolio Shares in Different Geographical Regions
The results in Tables 5 and 6 show that coefficients on the market and float portfolio shares are very low. The float portfolio denotes the market portfolio share corrected for non-tradable shares held by large shareholders. -Do these findings change when the impact of W * j,t on W act ij,t is analyzed for different regions and countries separately?
The size of the marginal effects of W * j,t and W float j,t differs significantly across regions. Tables 7 and 8 present regressions including region dummies or country dummies interacted with the market and the float portfolio share respectively. Compared to the reference region Western Europe, the marginal effect of the market portfolio share is significantly smaller for North America (Table  7 , specification (9)). The same picture applies to the float portfolio (Table 8 , specification (9)). In contrast, there is no significant difference between Western Europe and all other regions. Note that the marginal effect of W * j,t -which corresponds to the reference region Western Europe -is larger compared to the full sample results in Tables 5 and 6 being equal cannot be rejected, neither for Western Europe nor for the EMU (Table 8) .
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These results indicate that the float portfolio does not add any explanatory power, neither to the full sample nor to single regions.
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The two proxies for financial development might already account for the liquidity effect measured by the float portfolio. In the next paragraph this interpretation is further underlined with regression results in a sample with EMU countries only. 28 The coefficient corresponding to EMU is the sum of the coefficients of W * j,t and of (W * j,t ) * EMU. 29 This stands in contrast to Dahlquist et al. (2003) who show that the coefficient on W float j,t is larger than on W * j,t . However, they do not include any other proxies for financial market development in their regressions. (11) and (12) and the residual value of the market portfolio share, i.e., the difference between the market and the float portfolio share, W dif f j,t , enter the regression at the same time, both are separately insignificant but jointly significant (specification (13)). This changes once the proxy for equity market development in country j, logmcap j,t , is left out of the regression (specification (14)). In this case, only the float portfolio share is significant. This shows that for the EMU sub-sample the float portfolio share indeed seems to capture some liquidity effects of total equity shares traded at stock exchanges if these effects are not accounted for separately by equity market development, namely logmcap j,t .
Information frictions are still existent as shown by the large size of the coefficients of logdistance ij and samelegor ij . However, the coefficient of samelegor ij is not significant in 1997. Banking sector development, measured as private credit provided by the financial sector, is not significant in any of the years whereas stock market development matters in 2001, again with a negative effect for country i and a positive effect for country j. This result might point at the fact that banking sector developments within the EMU are fairly similar whereas differences in equity market development are still existent such that it matters for foreign portfolio shares.
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Diversification considerations seem to be existent in the EMU sample for both years: If returns are negatively correlated across countries, portfolio shares are higher. GDP growth opportunities in the country of destination, j, matters.
Overall, results for the EMU countries show that information frictions are very important. Results with respect to financial market development are mixed across years. Clearly, banking sector development does not matter in this sample as variation across EMU countries is very small. Moreover, the diversification considerations come out more clearly and the market portfolio share has a much larger impact compared to the full sample results.
Conclusion
This paper employs the IMF's Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey, in order to investigate institutional determinants of international equity portfolios. While a bilateral home bias in equities can be observed for most country pairs including the U.S., the data reveal a bilateral 'friendship bias' for several other country pairs, mostly countries within the same geographical region, in particular within the EMU. The empirical approach of the estimation analysis is based on the difference between actual equity portfolio shares and the ones predicted by the ICAPM under the assumption of perfect capital markets. This difference is used to investigate the relevance of institutional capital market frictions, such as information asymmetries, financial market development, and capital controls for equity holdings at the aggregate country level.
Financial market development is looked at from two different angles: equity market development and development of the banking sector. The results reveal that the degree of equity market development in the foreign country plays a significant positive role for foreign portfolio shares. At the same time, the development of the home banking sector has a positive effect. For holding foreign portfolio shares, it is advantageous to have well developed home financial institutions that organize and channel these investments efficiently. Liquidity constraints due to controlling shareholders are taken into account by using an alternative float portfolio instead of the market portfolio share. However, the float portfolio share has no additional explanatory power given all other covariates. The impact of financial market development is substantial, but less important, i.e., less significant, across specifications compared to the impact of information advantages. The latter are proxied by geographical proximity and the existence of a common legal origin or, alternatively, by the existence of a common colonial background. In contrast, capital controls do not play any significant role in determining equity portfolios.
In addition, variables mirroring investors' investment opportunities such as return correlations and GDP growth are included in the regression analysis. As in other empirical studies, no relation between stock market return correlations and foreign portfolio shares can be revealed. Only within the EMU a weakly significant coefficient is found that is in line with portfolio di-versification considerations. GDP growth in the foreign country is positively associated with foreign portfolio shares, which is in line with the observation that booming economies offer more promising investment opportunities.
The findings in this paper motivate future research that incorporates capital market frictions into models that simulate international investment and capital flows. Models that take this direction and explain (part of) the home bias can be found e.g. in Baxter and Jermann (1997) , Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) , Heathcote and Perri (2004) or . However, these papers focus only on non-tradable goods or costs associated with goods trade whereas the degree of financial market development, information frictions or direct barriers to investment are not considered.
samelegor ij dummy equal to one if both countries share a common legal origin; it is distinguished between German, French, Scandinavian civil law families, the English common law and the Socialist law family Source: La Porta, de Silanes, Shleifer, Vishney (1998) Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995) b gdpgrowth j,t yearly GDP growth in country j averaged across four years preceding year t, i.e., referring to the averages in years 1993-1996 for 1997 and 1997-2000 c ) For the subdivision of countries into regions see Table 2 .
